Who may begin a war for the United States? Congress. Article One, Section Eight of the Constitution gives the legislature, and no one else, the power to declare war, to raise armies, to grant letters of marque, to make rules for the forces it pays for. The executive was handed a different office: command of the armies the legislature raises, in the wars the legislature declares.
Why was it arranged that way? Because the men who wrote the document had studied where wars come from. A single ruler finds war attractive: it enlarges his office, hushes his critics, and spends other households' sons. A legislature of hundreds, each member answerable to a district that supplies the soldiers and pays the taxes, finds war expensive. The power was lodged where the reluctance lived, on the theory that the gravest act a state can perform should pass through the branch with the least appetite for performing it.
Has Congress used the power? Eleven times, across five conflicts, the last on the fifth of June 1942, against Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria. Every American war since, Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf, Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Iran, has been fought without a declaration.
What happened in 1973? Congress noticed the drift and legislated against it. The War Powers Resolution, passed that November over a presidential veto, conceded that a president may repel a sudden attack, then drew the line: forces introduced into hostilities must be reported to the legislature within forty-eight hours and withdrawn within sixty days unless Congress votes for them to stay, with thirty days more allowed for the withdrawing. It was written by a Congress that had watched an undeclared war consume a decade and more than fifty-eight thousand American lives, and its plain meaning is: never again without us.
Did the statute hold? No president of either party has conceded that it binds him. Reports are filed "consistent with" the Resolution rather than under it; the sixty-day clock is lawyered or ignored; the courts have declined to referee the quarrel. The statute has survived every administration since and constrained, on the record, almost none.
Who began the present war? The president, by order, in February, after a winter of preparation. No declaration was asked for; no authorisation was voted; the campaign's architects promised dominance of the air within days and preside, weeks on, over fighting that runs from Lebanon to the Gulf.
Was the sudden-attack exception available? That exception covers the missile already in flight, the emergency that outruns deliberation. A war prepared across months and launched on a chosen night is the opposite case, the one in which deliberation was fully available, and the very case the design was built to catch.
And this fortnight? Offered the one instrument still on its books, the Senate declined to use it. The resolution that would have limited the executive's authority to continue failed on the floor. The chamber did not vote for the war. It voted not to be consulted about it, which is a lower thing, since even a vote for the war would have reclaimed the power to vote.
What follows? Precedent. Each war waged on executive order alone makes the next one easier to wage the same way, and each legislative refusal to be counted teaches the executive the price of ignoring the legislature, which on current evidence is nothing. The power was not seized. It was surrendered, and surrenders are harder to reverse than seizures, because a seizure at least has a perpetrator to name.
What remains in force? The text. Article One has not been amended. The statute of 1973 has not been repealed. The sixty-day clock started, as a matter of law, when the first strike crossed into Iranian airspace, and it is running while these answers are set in type, inside a Congress that wrote the question and no longer cares to ask it.