Vol. II, No. 42
Covering 9 March - 22 March 2026
Monday, March 23, 2026
Late edition · A Relentless publication
All the fortnight that mattered, in technology and in the world, read next to what we were building at the time.
Honest about the day it was written, and no cleverer afterward.
THE WAR

The promised quick blow becomes a grinding war, and the "days" stretch into weeks

The Defense Secretary had promised uncontested air supremacy within days. Weeks in, Iranian missiles still cross the Gulf, Israeli troops are fighting in southern Lebanon, the dead climb into the thousands, and the war that was sold as swift and surgical has become the thing such wars always become: long, wide, and beyond anyone's control.

The war entered the phase its architects had promised it would skip. The American Defense Secretary had said, in the first days, that the United States would achieve uncontested air supremacy within days; two weeks on, Iranian ballistic missiles still reached Gulf targets, Israeli ground forces were fighting through southern Lebanon against Hezbollah, and the campaign that was sold as swift and surgical had settled into the grinding, widening shape that such campaigns reliably take once the first plan meets the enemy's refusal to collapse on schedule. The Iranian dead passed into the thousands, the leadership decapitated at the top had been inherited by Mojtaba Khamenei, and the state that was to be broken in a night was instead absorbing the blow and answering it, day after day, across a region with no clean front and no visible end.

The war's expansion followed the logic every wider war follows, each side striking what it could reach. Iranian missiles and drones continued to hit bases and facilities across Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the UAE; Israeli strikes and ground operations pushed into Lebanon; the oil infrastructure of the Gulf remained under threat and under fire. What had been promised as a matter of days was now measured in weeks with no terminus, and the distance between the promise of the swift war and the reality of the long one was, as it always is, filling with the dead.

THE ECONOMY

The oil shock hardens into a recession warning

Crude held above a hundred and ten dollars as the Strait of Hormuz stayed effectively closed to the shipping that feared it, and the war's economic shock began to set into something structural. Recession models that had sat quiet for a year jumped toward the threshold that has historically preceded a downturn; the supply shock of doubled oil, arriving atop existing tariffs, presented every central bank with the one problem it cannot solve, an inflation it can only worsen by fighting or tolerate by ignoring. And the great bet of the age, the artificial-intelligence build-out on which so much of the economy's growth had come to lean, faced its first genuine external test, as the cost of the energy that is its true foundation doubled overnight and the question of three years' standing, whether the digital future could survive a collision with the physical one, stopped being rhetorical.

IN BRIEF

Europe arms, the streets persist, Eid under fire

The war's nuclear logic propagated through a frightened Europe: France moved to increase its nuclear stockpile for the first time in decades and reached a deterrence arrangement with Denmark, as a continent that had spent eighty years sheltering under a borrowed umbrella began, in fear, to build its own. American antiwar demonstrations persisted in the cities even as the political system declined to constrain the war. And across the Muslim world, Eid al-Fitr arrived at the end of Ramadan under a sky of drones and missiles, a festival of mercy observed in the middle of a war, its ordinary joys pressed against an extraordinary grief.

The Column

A catechism of the war power

Plain questions put to the founding text and the statute book, with the plainest answers the record will support, set down in order.

Who may begin a war for the United States? Congress. Article One, Section Eight of the Constitution gives the legislature, and no one else, the power to declare war, to raise armies, to grant letters of marque, to make rules for the forces it pays for. The executive was handed a different office: command of the armies the legislature raises, in the wars the legislature declares.

Why was it arranged that way? Because the men who wrote the document had studied where wars come from. A single ruler finds war attractive: it enlarges his office, hushes his critics, and spends other households' sons. A legislature of hundreds, each member answerable to a district that supplies the soldiers and pays the taxes, finds war expensive. The power was lodged where the reluctance lived, on the theory that the gravest act a state can perform should pass through the branch with the least appetite for performing it.

Has Congress used the power? Eleven times, across five conflicts, the last on the fifth of June 1942, against Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria. Every American war since, Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf, Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Iran, has been fought without a declaration.

What happened in 1973? Congress noticed the drift and legislated against it. The War Powers Resolution, passed that November over a presidential veto, conceded that a president may repel a sudden attack, then drew the line: forces introduced into hostilities must be reported to the legislature within forty-eight hours and withdrawn within sixty days unless Congress votes for them to stay, with thirty days more allowed for the withdrawing. It was written by a Congress that had watched an undeclared war consume a decade and more than fifty-eight thousand American lives, and its plain meaning is: never again without us.

Did the statute hold? No president of either party has conceded that it binds him. Reports are filed "consistent with" the Resolution rather than under it; the sixty-day clock is lawyered or ignored; the courts have declined to referee the quarrel. The statute has survived every administration since and constrained, on the record, almost none.

Who began the present war? The president, by order, in February, after a winter of preparation. No declaration was asked for; no authorisation was voted; the campaign's architects promised dominance of the air within days and preside, weeks on, over fighting that runs from Lebanon to the Gulf.

Was the sudden-attack exception available? That exception covers the missile already in flight, the emergency that outruns deliberation. A war prepared across months and launched on a chosen night is the opposite case, the one in which deliberation was fully available, and the very case the design was built to catch.

And this fortnight? Offered the one instrument still on its books, the Senate declined to use it. The resolution that would have limited the executive's authority to continue failed on the floor. The chamber did not vote for the war. It voted not to be consulted about it, which is a lower thing, since even a vote for the war would have reclaimed the power to vote.

What follows? Precedent. Each war waged on executive order alone makes the next one easier to wage the same way, and each legislative refusal to be counted teaches the executive the price of ignoring the legislature, which on current evidence is nothing. The power was not seized. It was surrendered, and surrenders are harder to reverse than seizures, because a seizure at least has a perpetrator to name.

What remains in force? The text. Article One has not been amended. The statute of 1973 has not been repealed. The sixty-day clock started, as a matter of law, when the first strike crossed into Iranian airspace, and it is running while these answers are set in type, inside a Congress that wrote the question and no longer cares to ask it.

Field Notes
A Relentless build, told plainly

The war changed the question, not the data

My siting tool took the oil shock in its stride; the arithmetic held and the rankings moved as they should. What did not survive the fortnight intact was the question the tool had been built to answer. No client is named.

I have spent this year building software around one question, described in these pages in February: given that you want to build a data centre with the power demand of a small town, where, on an already-strained electrical grid, can you actually put it? This fortnight the war doubled the price of oil, the doubling worked through gas into the price of electricity, and the model took it calmly. Costs were always inputs; the inputs moved; the rankings re-sorted themselves overnight and the arithmetic never blinked. If the story ended there it would be a pleasant note about robust software, and it does not end there.

It ended in the telephone calls, because the people ringing me were no longer asking the tool's question. Before February, every conversation reduced to cheapest: cheapest viable power, cheapest land, cheapest route to energisation. The calls since the strikes have a different noun in them. Which of these sites is safest if the shock lasts two years; which keeps the most options open; which depends least on any one fuel, one interconnection, one political mood. Same clients, same sites, same data, and a different question, arrived not through a requirements workshop but through the evening news. My tool, built to minimise a cost, had no column for regret, and the discovery of the fortnight is that the objective, the one element I had treated as the fixed star the whole design orbited, turned out to be the most perishable thing in the system.

So the work now is a strange kind of refit: not a single number changes, and the purpose does. The optimiser learns to answer for resilience as readily as for cost; the question becomes a setting rather than a foundation. And the lesson I am taking from it reaches past this tool: a system encodes a question, every schema and screen of it, and questions age faster than data. Requirements are dated documents in both senses of the word. Anyone building something meant to last should ask, somewhere early, not only whether the answers will still be right in five years but whether anyone will still be asking this, and should build as though the honest reply to the second is no.

The Back Page

Eid in the shelter

The festival of Eid al-Fitr came at the end of Ramadan, the celebration of mercy and renewal that closes the month of fasting, and it came to much of the Muslim world under a sky of drones. There is an old human stubbornness in the observance of a feast during a war, in the insistence on the sweets and the prayers and the children's new clothes while the missiles cross overhead, and it is easy to read it as either heartbreaking or futile, the small rituals of ordinary life dwarfed by the enormity around them. But it can be read the other way round, and we, who have spent a hard fortnight cataloguing the instruments of destruction, choose it. The feast kept in the middle of the war is not a denial of the war; it is a refusal to let the war be the only thing, an assertion, against the missiles, that the people beneath them are still people, still keeping their days and their faith and their love for one another, still human in the way that the abstractions of war are designed to make us forget. The bombs fell on Eid. And the families, where they could, still gathered, still prayed, still pressed the ordinary sweetness of the festival against the extraordinary bitterness of the hour, and in that pressing there is a kind of resistance that no army can defeat, because it is the simple, unkillable insistence of ordinary life on continuing to be lived, even here, even now, even under this sky.