Vol. II, No. 40
Covering 9 February - 22 February 2026
Monday, February 23, 2026
Late edition · A Relentless publication
All the fortnight that mattered, in technology and in the world, read next to what we were building at the time.
The machine moves fast; the paper, on principle, does not.
THE GULF

The fleet is in place, the rhetoric is total, and a war with Iran now looks not possible but planned

An American armada sits off Iran; the leadership in Washington and Jerusalem speaks of destroying its missiles, sinking its navy, ending its regime. The skirmishes of the fortnight had the feel not of a crisis drifting toward war but of a war being readied, deliberately, and about to begin.

By the close of this fortnight the confrontation with Iran had the unmistakable character not of a crisis that might yet be averted but of a war being deliberately prepared. An American naval armada was in position off the Iranian coast; the rhetoric from Washington and Jerusalem had hardened past the point of negotiation into the language of objectives, the destruction of Iran's ballistic missiles, the sinking of its navy, the permanent denial of any nuclear capability, and, increasingly openly, the end of its regime. The sea skirmishes continued, tankers and drones and warnings, but they now read less as a spiralling accident than as the choreography before a curtain, the positioning of forces and the preparation of the ground, and the question in the world's capitals shifted from whether there would be a war with Iran to when it would begin and how far it would spread.

Iran, for its part, convulsed and cornered, its economy in ruins, its streets torn between protest against its own government and dread of the foreign blow now visibly coming, prepared its retaliation, its missiles and its proxies and its ability to close the Strait of Hormuz through which a fifth of the world's oil flows. The prospect was of a war unlike the region's recent ones: not a strike and a calibrated response, as in the exchanges of 2024, but a full assault on a nation of ninety million, with the declared aim of destroying its military and toppling its state, and a retaliation that could engulf the Gulf, spike the price of oil worldwide, and draw in every power with an interest in the most combustible region on earth. The fleet was in place. The objectives were declared. The fortnight ended with the world holding its breath, and the breath did not feel like hope.

GENEVA

The powers meet over Ukraine's head, again

A third round of talks among the United States, Ukraine and Russia took place in Geneva on February 17 and 18, the diplomacy over Ukraine's fate grinding on in the now-established pattern: the great powers negotiating the terms, Ukraine pressed to accept them, Europe scrambling at the edges. With American military aid to Kyiv halted and American attention consumed by the gathering war with Iran, Ukraine's position weakened further, and the settlement taking shape remained the one long foreseen, a peace on terms favourable to the aggressor, imposed on the invaded, and made more likely by the simple fact that the power brokering it had bigger wars to fight.

IN BRIEF

The Games close; the world braces

The Winter Olympics continued in the Italian Alps, a fortnight of sport playing out against the drumbeat of the coming war, the athletes competing under one flag while the fleets gathered under others. Markets grew jittery as the prospect of a full war with Iran, and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, threatened an oil shock that would ripple through every economy on earth. And the American state ground on with its other business, the deportations, the dismantling of agencies, the release of the Epstein files, as the country prepared, with a strange normalcy, to go to war.

The Column

Four trials of a single prediction

The argument for attacking Iran contains a forecast about what follows, and the region has run that forecast four times since 2001. The results are on the record. They are set out below, in order, with the scores.

The advocates of a war on Iran make a prediction, and because it is a prediction rather than a sentiment it can be checked. The prediction is that destroying a hostile state's leadership and arsenal from the air leaves the region safer afterwards than it was before. I want to take that seriously enough to test it, which means granting its premises at their strongest: that Tehran is close to a weapon, that the regime jails and kills its own women, that deterrence is a wager with terrible stakes. Grant all of it. The prediction still has to survive contact with four occasions on which it was made before, by serious people, about this same region, within the memory of anyone reading.

Afghanistan, October 2001. The government fell in nine weeks. Twenty years later the same movement governs from the same palace, having outlasted the occupation by simply waiting for it to end, and the women of Kabul have lost the schooling that the war was latterly said to have been about. Iraq, March 2003. The state was decapitated inside a month, and the decade that followed produced an insurgency, the Islamic State, and the delivery of Baghdad into the political orbit of Tehran, which is to say that the war handed Iran the prize its architects were trying to deny it.

Libya, March 2011. Here the test is at its cleanest, because Muammar Gaddafi had done the thing the West asks. In 2003 he surrendered his nuclear programme, opened his sites, shipped out the centrifuges, and was received for it. Eight years later the aircraft came anyway, and he died in a drainage pipe outside Sirte, and the country he left behind has produced a civil war, a slave market, and the arms that armed the Sahel. Pyongyang drew the obvious conclusion and has never since entertained an offer. The fourth trial is Lebanon and Gaza across these past two years, where the destruction of a leadership from the air has been attempted at a scale without recent precedent, and where no one, on any side, can now say the region is quieter for it.

What the four have in common is a confusion about what a regime is. Airpower is extremely good at killing the men whose names are known and extremely poor at touching the conditions that produced them, and those conditions are the regime. Strike from outside and a divided population finds its divisions suddenly less urgent than the aircraft; the hardest faction in the capital, having argued all along that the foreigner only respects force, is proved right in front of everyone; and the surviving leadership concludes that it gave up too little rather than too much. Each of those is a step away from the safety the bombing was supposed to buy.

So I am not going to appeal to anyone's sympathy for a civilian nation of ninety million, though I have it and will not pretend otherwise. I am asking for something smaller and harder to refuse. Before the fleet now assembling in the Gulf is given its order, let someone who wants this war name the trial that went the other way. One case, in twenty-five years, where this prediction was made in this region and the region came out safer. If the answer is that Iran is different, then the difference is the whole argument and it should be made in the open, on the evidence, where it can be examined, and not slipped in underneath a forecast that has already failed four times.

The Back Page

The last fortnight of before

The fortnight before a war has a quality all its own, and I have felt it more than once, and I feel it now: the strange doubled time in which ordinary life continues, the Games in the Alps, the markets, the deportations, the release of old scandals, while underneath everything runs the knowledge that a line is about to be crossed after which nothing will be ordinary again. The people of Iran are living inside that doubled time now, going to work, feeding their children, arguing with their government, loving each other, under a sky in which an American armada is visibly preparing to rain fire. And if the blow falls, I already know what the histories will call it: inevitable, because inevitable is the name history gives to whatever occurred, and the word will be a lie told backwards. Nothing in this fortnight is inevitable from inside it, where the fleets could still turn, where the offer not yet made could still be made, where the thing has not happened and might yet not; inevitability is manufactured afterwards, out of hindsight, to spare everyone who had a choice the memory of having had it. This is, I fear, the last fortnight of before. If the war comes, next fortnight there will be an after, and I dread that the after will be measured in the dead, and that the world will move, as it always does, from the question of whether the war should happen to the management of the war that did, and that the space to have said no will have closed. It is still, as I write, barely, open. It will not be open long. I have watched this exact door close, more than once, and I do not believe it will not close again, and I write this only so that it cannot be said, afterward, that no one saw the door, and no one, while it was still open, called out.