A "peace plan" written in Washington and Moscow, and handed to the victim to sign
A 28-point American plan to end the war leaked this fortnight, and it read, to Kyiv and its allies, less like a peace than a capitulation: Ukrainian territory ceded, its army capped, its NATO hopes ended, its future dictated by the two powers negotiating over its head. Europe scrambled to soften it. The victim was told to be grateful.
A plan to end the war in Ukraine, drafted by the American administration in close consultation with Moscow, emerged and landed in Kyiv like a blow. Its 28 points, as leaked, amounted to something close to Russia's maximum demands: Ukraine would cede territory it still holds, cap the size of its army, abandon its aspiration to join NATO, and accept a settlement negotiated substantially over its head between Washington and Moscow, with Europe and Ukraine itself relegated to accepting terms shaped by the two great powers. To Kyiv and its European allies, it read not as a peace but as a capitulation dressed as one, a reward to the aggressor for its aggression, and the imposition on the victim of terms it would never freely accept, under the threat that American support, already withdrawn once, would vanish entirely if it refused. Frantic diplomacy in Geneva produced a revised, somewhat softened version, and the negotiations churned on, but the message of the original draft was clear: the fate of Ukraine would be decided by the powerful, and the country whose blood had been spilled for four years would be handed the result to sign.
It was where the long reversal of the year finally came to rest, the transactional presidency's approach to the war reaching its logical end: peace defined not as justice or security for the invaded but as a deal between great powers, in which the aggressor is rewarded, the victim is pressured, and the outcome is measured by whether the fighting stops, not by whether the settlement is just or durable. Whether Ukraine could be forced to accept it, whether Europe could soften it enough to be survivable, whether Russia would honour any deal it signed, remained unresolved. But the spectacle of a plan to end a war of aggression that rewarded the aggressor and dictated terms to the victim was a fitting emblem of an order in which strength is honoured and principle is a luxury, and in which the difference between a peace and a capitulation is a distinction the powerful no longer trouble to make.