The second city of America burns, and the hydrants run dry
Wind-driven wildfires tore through Los Angeles this fortnight, incinerating whole neighbourhoods from Pacific Palisades to Altadena, killing dozens and destroying thousands of homes. Firefighters arrived to find the hydrants empty. A city that thought itself the future watched it burn.
Firestorms driven by hurricane-force winds swept across Los Angeles from January 7, destroying entire communities, killing at least 24 people, a toll certain to rise as the burned neighbourhoods were searched, and burning more than 12,000 structures in what will rank among the most destructive wildfires in American history. The Palisades fire consumed one of the wealthiest enclaves in the country; the Eaton fire obliterated much of Altadena, a historic middle-class community; and for days the nation watched, live, as one of its great cities burned block by block, the smoke visible from space, whole streets of homes reduced to ash and lone chimneys, the famous and the ordinary alike fleeing with what they could carry. The winds were so fierce that aircraft could not fly and the flames outran every effort to contain them.
And then came the detail that turned a natural disaster into an indictment: in the Palisades, as the fire raged, the fire hydrants ran dry. A water system built for structure fires, not for a wind-driven inferno consuming an entire district at once, was overwhelmed, its tanks drained, its pressure gone, leaving firefighters standing at dead hydrants as houses burned around them. A key reservoir had been offline for repairs. Officials will spend years apportioning blame, among the water system, the fire budget, the forestry practices, the climate that made the landscape a tinderbox, and the failure to clear it. But every one of those answers will be filed by a different office, and there is the deeper indictment: the fire arrived as one event, wind and fuel and water pressure and budget acting together, and it was met by a city that manages them as separate concerns in separate departments, each defensible on its own terms, none accountable for the whole. The catastrophe got in not through any single agency but through the unowned ground between them, which no budget line covers and nobody is paid to patrol.